

…suffering also reveals to the sufferer a greater depth of human experience and meaning. Contemporary bioethics has nothing to say when those who suffer need help in making sense of their experience.Ī second reason that bioethics gave up on suffering is that the field has become closely associated with medicine. This new “thin” approach provides no space to explore the meaning of suffering. Bioethicists became consultants, educators, and guides seeking bureaucratic solutions for bioethical problems.
#The sufferer and the witness poster how to#
No longer was there a concern with ends, the interest shifted to means – that is, how to design guidelines and regulations that would protect patients and research subjects. As the field developed, the questions that interested bioethicists became much “thinner” and more formal. The search for answers to these questions drew on theological and philosophical insights. Footnote 6 In the early days of the field, bioethicists were concerned with “thick”, substantive questions about the meaning of human life and the effect of new technologies on what it means to be human. First, as John Evans points out in his book Playing God, the field has moved from “thick” to “thin” bioethics. Two features of bioethics are resposible for this bioethical ignorance of suffering. Ethical systems that leave the problem of suffering (and related concepts of endurance and courage) to particular theological traditions cannot adequately engage the human core of illness and care.
#The sufferer and the witness poster professional#
One is surprised to find so many professional ethical volumes in which does not appear as an entry in the index. As the secular voice of moral decision making, bioethics has ceded inquiries on the nature and meaning of suffering to religion. Remarkably, in spite of this foundational disquiet, the field has spent very little intellectual energy on responses to suffering. It is, in fact, fair to say that bioethics was born because of this deep concern with human suffering. These histories reference the harmful experiments conducted on humans without their consent during World War II (notably by the Germans, but also by the Japanese and the Americans), the use of poor people and minorities in medical research, Footnote 2, Footnote 3 and the tough choices that had to be made when kidney dialysis was new and available only to a few. There are varied accounts of the conditions that generated the move from medical ethics to bioethics, but common to all is concern with the unnecessary suffering of research subjects and patients. While interest in the ethics of medicine is as old as the healing arts themselves, bioethics is, as noted above, a relatively recent field of inquiry and practice. Thus religion is ghettoized: we have, for example, Catholic bioethics, Jewish bioethics, and Islamic bioethics. Yes, religion has some limited moral legitimacy, appropriate for certain groups and individuals, but it has no claim on broader moral theory. As a consequence, bioethics compartmentalizes religion.

At the same time, the bioethical precept of universalism makes it impossible to include religion as a serious element in moral decision-making.

Foundational to the field is “respect for persons”, a precept that demands that religious beliefs not be dismissed as merely collections of irrational myths. These encounters are challenging because they highlight an essential tension in the precepts of bioethics. Given its mission to bring a secular morality to medicine and the life sciences - where ethical questions about the boundaries and meaning of life abound - bioethics finds itself constantly bumping up against religion. Bioethics was born in a context characterized by moral pluralism and shifting ideas about the nature of moral authority it was, and is, an effort to develop a set of principles and a method for moral decision-making acceptable to all, regardless of one’s religion or ideology.
